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DEDUCTIBILITY oF LEGAL FEES FOR TAX ADVCE IN
ESTATE PLANNING
Sidney Merians, 60 T.C. 187 (1973)
Petitioners deducted an unitemized bill for legal services from their
joint tax return, alleging that the fee was within the intendment of
section 212(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19541 because it
arose solely from advice and services on tax matters in connection with
the development and implementation of the petitioners' estate plan.
The Commissioner's brief acknowledged the "probability that some of
the legal fees represented services which are deductible under section
212(3),' '2 but the Commissioner contended there was no evidence
upon which to base an allocation and therefore disallowed the entire
deduction as a nondeductible personal expense.8 The Tax Court dis-
agreed as to lack of evidence upon which to base an allocation, in-
terpreted the Commissioner's statement as a concession on the issue
of deductibility, and held: 20% of the fee was deductible as an ex-
pense for tax advice.4
Deductions are a matter of "legislative grace,"5 Congress having the
power to provide for or withhold deductions through legislation. Rev-
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 212(3):
Expenses for the production of income. In the case of an individual, there
shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year-
(3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax.
2. Sidney Merians, 60 T.C. 187, 188 (1973).
3. The case would then be governed by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 262:
Personal, Living, and Family Expenses. Except as otherwise expressly pro-
vided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or
family expenses.
4. Sidney Merians, 60 T.C. 187 (1973). The Internal Revenue Service has ac-
quiesced in the decision. 1973 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 42, at 6. The decision was entered
under Rule 50, indicating neither complete victory nor total defeat, and requiring recom-
putation of the amount in controversy by the Service. See Caldwell, Tax Court Proce-
dure: Problems but not Pitfalls, N.Y.U. 27TH INsT. ON FED. TAX. 1435, 1446 (1969);
Greenberger, Scope of Rule 50 Computation, N.Y.U. 12TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 963
(1954); Miller, Tax Court Pleadings and Rule 50 Settlements: Points to be Considered
in the Petitioner's Behalf, N.Y.U. 5TH INsT. ON FED. TAx. 158, 179 (1947).
5. See, e.g., New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934);
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enue acts traditionally allow deductions for the "ordinary and neces-
sary" business expenses incurred by a taxpayer in earning his yearly
gross income on the premise that determinations of taxable income
should realistically account for the costs of business operations.'
Under one statutory version of this principle, section 23(a) of the
1932 Revenue Act,7 the Supreme Court ruled that an individual's per-
sonal expenses for supervising his own securities investments were not
deductible as "the carrying on [of] any trade or business."" Congres-
sional response to this decision was to treat all income-producing acti-
vities, regardless of their source, as a business deduction.' The criter-
Lydon v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 539, 546 (7th Cir. 1965); Zeddies v. Commissioner,
264 F.2d 120, 126 (7th Cir. 1959).
6. This concept has been followed in all federal revenue legislation to date. In
the 1913 Revenue Act, the concept began to take the shape it has today:
That in computing net income for the purpose of the normal tax there shall
be allowed as deductions: First, the necessary expenses actually paid in carry-
ing on any business, not including personal, living, or family expenses ....
Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 167.
Such net income shall be ascertained by deducting from the gross amount of
income of such corporation, joint-stock company or association, or insurance
company, received within the year from all sources, (first) all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid within the year in the maintenance and operation
of its business and properties, including rentals or other payments required to
be made as a condition to the continued use or possession of property; (sec-
ond) all losses actually sustained within the year and not compensated by in-
suance or otherwise, including a reasonable allowance for depreciation by
use, wear and tear of property, if any ....
id. at 172. See generally Tax on Net Income of Corporations: Message from the
President of the United States [President Taft], S. Doc. No. 98, 61st Cong., 1st Sess.
3 (1909): "The tax on net income is preferable to one proportionate to a percentage
of the gross receipts, because it is a tax upon success and not failure."
7. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 23(a), 47 Stat. 169:
DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS INCOME. In computing net income there
shall be allowed as deductions:
(a) EXPENSES. All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including a rea-
sonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services ac-
tually rendered; traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for
meals and lodging) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or busi-
ness; and rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to
the continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of prop-
erty to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which
he has no equity.
8. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
9. Section 121(a) of the 1942 Revenue Act, ch. 619, tit. I, § 121(a), 56 Stat. 819,
expanded § 23(a) into two sections; only § 23(a) (2) is relevant here:
NON-TRADE OR NON-BUSINESS EXPENSES.-In the case of an individ-
ual, all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the tax-
able year for the production or collection of income, or for the management,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/8
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ia established in section 23(a)(2) were reiterated in sections 212(1)
and (2) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Act.10 Section 23 (a) (2) had
been consistently interpreted by the courts as permitting deduction of
expenses incurred in determining income and estate tax liabilities,"
but the Supreme Court subsequently held that expenses arising out
of gift tax liabilities were not included.' 2  Congress eliminated this
inconsistency when section 212 was enacted by adding subsection (3)
to allow deductions for expenses paid "in connection with the deter-
uination, collection, or refund of any tax."18
conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income.
See also H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, 74-75 (1942); S. REP. No. 1229,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1942) (remarks of Cong. Disney).
Judicial interpretation of the purpose of § 23(a)(2) is clearly stated in United
States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 44-45 (1963):
Prior to 1942 § 23 allowed deductions only for expenses incurred "in carrying
on any trade or business," the deduction presently authorized by § 23(a)(1).
In Higgins v. Commissioner, [312 U.S. 212 (1941)], this Court gave that
provision a narrow construction, holding that the activities of an individual
in supervising his own securities investments did not constitute the "carrying
on of a trade or business," and hence that expenses incurred in connection
with such activities were not tax deductible. . . . The Revenue Act of 1942
(56 Stat. 798, § 121), by adding what is now § 23(a)(2), sought to remedy
the inequity inherent in the disallowance of expense deductions in respect of
such profit-seeking activities, the income from which was nonetheless taxable.
10. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 212:
Expenses for the Production of Income. In the case of an individual, there
shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year-
(1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held
for the production of income ....
Judicial understanding of §§ 212(1) and (2) is clearly stated in Meyer J. Fleischman,
45 T.C. 439, 445 (1966): "In connection with section 212(1) and (2), the legislative
history specifically states that no substantive change is made from section 23(a) (2)
Thus, the Code simply puts in separate paragraphs what was once one sen-
11. For cases holding fees deductible as expenses incurred in connection with the
management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of in-
come, see Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945) (legal fees paid by
trustees to contest tax deficiency determination); Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 646
(8th Cir. 1952) (legal fees to prevent break-up of taxpayer's stockholding as result of
divorce settlement which would cause him to lose control of corporation); Nancy
Reynolds Bagley, 8 T.C. 130 (1947) (legal fees paid for investment advice and advice
on selection of estate plan); Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr., 2 T.C. 1128 (1943) (accounting
and auditing expenses in connection with investment activities).
12. Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952).
13. H.R. RaP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1954):
Existing law allows an individual to deduct expenses connected with earn-
ing income or managing and maintaining income-producing property. UnderWashington University Open Scholarship
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Initially, the Internal Revenue Service sought to restrict section 212
(3) deductions to actual tax controversies,'14 but has now acquiesced
in the decisions of the courts that expenses for tax advice are deduct-
ible irrespective of their nature.'5 But the test which the courts will
apply in defining what constitutes a deductible expense incurred "in
regulations costs incurred in connection with contests over certain tax liabil-
ities, such as income and estate taxes, have been allowed, but these costs have
been disallowed where the contest involved gift-tax liability. A new provision
added by your committee allows a deduction for expenses connected with de-
termination, collection, or refund of any tax liability.
Id. at A59:
Paragraph (3) is new and is designed to permit the deduction by an indi-
vidual of legal and other expenses paid or incurred in connection with a con-
tested tax liability, whether the contest be Federal, State, or municipal taxes,
or whether the tax be income, estate, gift, property, and so forth. Any ex-
penses incurred in contesting any liability collected as a tax or as a part of
the tax will be deductible.
The remarks of the Senate Finance Committee are identical with the second quoted
paragraph. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 218 (1954). See also notes 1
& 10 supra.
14. The Service has based this contention on the repeated use of the word
"contest" in relation to tax liabilities in the legislative history of § 212(3). See
note 13 supra. For cases in which the Service has argued in favor of this position,
see cases cited note 15 infra. See also Kabaker, Deductibility of Estate Planning Fees,
54 ILL. B.J. 726, 727 (1966).
15. Kaufmann v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Mo. 1963) (fees paid
to accountant for preparing statement submitted to Service for ruling on taxability of
exchange of shares in corporation held deductible); Munn v. United States, 455 F.2d
1028 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (one-third of amount paid in attorney's fees in divorce proceeding
deductible as tax advice and services); George v. United States, 434 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl.
1970) (where attorney's fees in divorce proceeding were based upon value of property
acquired by client according to fee schedule recommended by state bar association and
not upon extent of tax advice, only 10% of fee deductible); Carpenter v. United States,
338 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (fees paid to attorney for advice relating to tax conse-
quences of divorce settlement held deductible); James A. Collins, 54 T.C. 1656
(1970) (fees paid to attorney for tax advice in connection with purchase of apartment
building, preparation of income tax returns, and litigation arising out of those returns
held deductible); George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688 (1968), aNf'd per curiam on other
grounds, 420 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1970). There is some debate whether this is in accord
with the position taken by the Service in Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(1) (1957):
Expenses paid or incurred by an individual in connection with the determina-
tion, collection, or refund of any tax, whether the taxing authority be Federal,
State, or municipal, and whether the tax be income, estate, gift, property, or
any other tax, are deductible. Thus, expenses paid or incurred by a taxpayer
for tax counsel or expenses paid or incurred in connection with the prepara-
tion of his tax returns or in connection with any proceedings involved in de-
termining the extent of his tax liability or in contesting his tax liability are
deductible.
See Sidney Merians, 60 T.C. 187, 194 (1973) (Withey, J., dissenting).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/8
336 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax"''
is still uncertain. Under section 212(2) of the 1954 Code1" and its
predecessor in the 1939 Code, section 23(a)(2), 18 the Supreme Court
derived two complementary tests for deduotibility. In Trust of Bing-
ham v. Commissioner9 the Court held that deductions were allowable
if there was a "direct connection" between the expense sought to be
deducted and the management, conservation, or maintenance of the
property in question, in this case a trust. This standard created a split
in the lower courts for nearly twenty years as to whether deductibility
could be predicated on the "consequences that might result to a tax-
payer's income-producing property from a failure to defeat the
claim.120  The conflict was resolved by the articulation of the "origin"
test in United States v. Gilmore.2 ' Maintaining that the "conse-
quences" test would create inequalities based on the type of assets the
taxpayer owned when claims asserted against him could be satisfied
from income- rather than non-income-producing property, Gilmore
held that the "origin and character of -the claim" were controlling. 2
Gilmore eliminated the "consequences" 'test while not specifically fore-
closing reliance on the "direct connection" test stated in Bingham. Al-
though section 212(3) was enacted to override the limitations of sec-
tion 212(2),23 whether either the direct connection or origin test is to
be used in determining deductibility under section 212(3) remains
unresolved because the only post-Gilmore case that has mentioned the
16. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212(3).
17. See note 10 supra.
18. See note 9 supra.
19. 325 U.S. 365, 374 (1945).
20. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 48 (1963) (emphasis original).
21. 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
22. Justice Harlan's full statement is as follows:
But it was manifestly Congress' purpose with respect to deductibility to place
all income-producing activities on an equal footing.
...[We resolve the conflict among the lower courts on the question be-
fore us ...in favor of the view that the origin and character of the claim
with respect to which an expense was incurred, rather than its potential con-
sequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer, is the controlling basic test of
whether the expense was "business" or "personal" and hence whether it is de-
ductible or not .. . .We find the reasoning underlying the cases taking the
"consequences" view unpersuasive.
Id. at 49 (emphasis original). See also United States v. Patrick, 372 U.S. 53 (1963)
(companion case to Gilmore) (principles governing Gilmore held applicable to deny tax-
payer deduction for legal fees paid in connection with property settlement incidental
to divorce proceedings).
23. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text,
[Vol. 1974:332
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problem looked to "tax consequences" to settle the deductibility is-
sue.
2 4
Once a deduction has been provided for by statute, the taxpayer
claiming the deduction is required to satisfy two burdens of proof.
First, the taxpayer must establish that he is entitled to the deduction.2 5
To qualify for deductibility under section 212(3), an "ordinary and
necessary" expense2" must be both reasonable in amount 7 and bear
a reasonable and proximate relation to the determination, dollection,
or refund of any tax.28  The proximate relation and reasonable
amount criteria have been found to allow a deduction for expenses
incurred in the preparation of any tax return,29 as well as the settling
of any kind of tax controversy with the Government.
24. Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366, 367 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (emphasis
added):
Although [the Commissioner] disputes the validity of a good faith allocation
made by plaintiffs attorney, the evidence establishes that at least seventy per-
cent of the total bill . . . represented the fee properly allocable to services
and advice as to the tax consequences flowing from the divorce and separa-
tion.
25. See, e.g., Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1935); New Colonial Ice Co. v.
Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1933); Lydon v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1965);
Ashcraft v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1958).
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(d) (1957):
Expenses, to be deductible under section 212, must be "ordinary and neces-
sary". Thus, such expenses must be reasonable in amount and bear a rea-
sonable and proximate relation to the production or collection of taxable in-
come or to the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held
for the production of income.
27. See, e.g., Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945); Jones v.
United States, 279 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1968); Alex H. Washburn, 33 T.C. 1003,
af fd, 283 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1960). See also note 26 supra.
28. See notes 14-24 supra and accompanying text.
29. Kaufmann v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Mo. 1963); James A.
Collins, 54 T.C. 1656 (1970); Michael J. Ippolito, 24 CICH Tax Ct. Mem. 894 (1965).
30. Kaufmann v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Mo. 1963); Carpenter v.
United States, 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964); cf. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner,
325 U.S. 365 (1945). Judge Davis' dissenting opinion in Carpenter challenged the
deductibility of expenses arising out of tax matters irrespective of their nature. Prem-
ising his argument on the legislative history of § 212(3) and the Supreme Court's avoid-
ance of the issue in United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), he stated:
The ultimate consequence of the wider view of the regulation, adopted by this
court, is that individual taxpayers will be able automatically to deduct counsel
fees paid for the general planning of their holdings and estates so as to mini-
mize income, estate, or gift taxes in the years ahead, or for arranging marital
or family affairs with the same end of tax-minimization in the future, or for
planning charitable or foundation gifts (and allocation of assets) for such a
purpose. Hitherto, the large share of these costs which fall outside section
212(1) and (2) have been personal expenses, barred from deduction by Sec-
tion 262 of the 1954 Code ....https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/8
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Secondly, the taxpayer must meet the burden of allocation, that is,
separating his expenses into deductible and nondeductible categories.
According to the courts, the taxpayer meets this 'burden by making
a good faith, reasonable allocation. 1  Moreover, since the 1930 deci-
sion in Cohan v. Commissioner,2 the courts have estimated the appro-
priate deduction when allocations made by the taxpayer have not been
reasonable, either because of the excessiveness of the amount de-
duoted or the lack of specificity in calculating the deduction. Under
the Cohan rule, courts will consider any evidence, offered either by
testimony"3 or taken from the taxpayer's incomplete records, 4 and use
that information to estimate a reasonable deduction. In so doing, the
courts bear heavily against the taxpayer because the "inexactitude is
of his own making;"35 the Cohan rule, however, has consistently been
338 F.2d at 372 (Davis, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). See notes 3 supra & 55 infra
and accompanying text.
The Court in Davis explicitly limited its holding to finding that the husband's pay-
ments for his former wife's attorney's fees as required by state law in a divorce proceed-
ing were not deductible under § 212(3) since "we read the statute ... to include only
the expenses of the taxpayer himself and not those of his wife." 370 U.S. at 74. Since
there was no challenge by the Service to the husband's deductions for the same type of
services, the Court expressly left that question open.
31. Munn v. United States, 455 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1972); George v. United
States, 434 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl.
1964). See also Rev. Rul. 72-545, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 179 (if reasonable basis exists
for allocating as tax advice a portion of legal fee incurred in connection with divorce
proceeding such portion is deductible under § 212(3)). The majority opinion in
Merians cited this Revenue Ruling in support of the court's expansive reading of §
212(3). 60 T.C. at 188.
32. 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). Congress placed some limits on the availability
of the Cohan rule in the Revenue Act of 1962 by specifically requiring substantiation
of certain deductions arising out of entertainment expenses. Pub. L. No. 87-834, §
4(a) (1), 76 Stat. 974 (1962) (codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 274).
33. Thomas v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1959); Cohan v. Commis-
sioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930); Herbert Schellenbarg, 31 T.C. 1269 (1959), rev'd
on other grounds, 283 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1960). But the court is not required to ac-
cept even uncontradicted testimony if it appears highly improbable or manifestly un-
reasonable. See, e.g., Oliver v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Lease, 346 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1965); Factor v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 100
(9th Cir. 1960); Clark v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1959); Carter v.
Commissioner, 257 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1958); Winters v. Dallman, 238 F.2d 912 (7th
Cir. 1956).
34. See, e.g., Welch v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1961); Gordon v.
Commissioner, 268 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1959); Herbert Schellenbarg, 31 T.C. 1269
(1959), rev'd on other grounds, 283 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1960).
35. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). The opinion, written by
Judge Learned Hand, stated:
Washington University Open Scholarship
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applied even in the face of challenge by the Commissioner."'
Congress has authorized the Internal Revenue Service to assess a
deficiency when either the burden of deduction or the burden of allo-
cation has not been met.17  Courts treat these deficiency determina-
tions as presumptively correct,8 regardless of the absence of particu-
lars or explanations as to how the assessment was made. 9 The tax-
payer has the burden of proving that the Commissioner's determina-
tion was either erroneous40 or arbitrary and unreasonable.4' Prior to
Absolute certainty in such matters [business expenses sought to be deducted]
is usually impossible and is not necessary; the Board should make as close
an approximation as it can, bearing heavily if it chooses upon the taxpayer
whose inexactitude is of his own making. But to allow nothing at all appears
to us inconsistent with saying that something was spent. . . . [Ihere was
obviously some basis for computation, if necessary by drawing upon the
Board's personal estimates of the minimum of such expenses. The amount
may be trivial and unsatisfactory, but there was basis for some allowance, and
it was wrong to refuse any. . . . It is not fatal that the result will inevitably
be speculative; many important decisions must be such. We think that the
Board was in error as to this and must reconsider the evidence.
Id. at 543-44. But cf. note 32 supra.
36. See, e.g., Earl Vest, 57 T.C. 128 (1971); George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688
(1968), a!f'd per curiam, 420 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1970); Estate of A.P. Steckel, 26 T.C.
600 (1956), afj'd per curiam, 253 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1958).
37. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6201. See also id. §§ 6211-16 (additional pro-
cedural rules applicable to deficiency assessments).
38. See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); Lydon v. Commissioner,
351 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1965); Hord v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1944).
See also George v. United States, 434 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (court allowed 10% de-
duction for tax advice and counsel on basis of Commissioner's concession that at most
10% of fee could be deductible).
This position is further substantiated by TAx Cr. R. 32:
BURDEN OF PROOF. The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner, ex-
cept as otherwise provided by statute, and except that in respect of any new
matter pleaded in his answer, it shall be upon respondent.
In fraud cases, however, the Commissioner must establish the fraud by clear and
convincing proof. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7454(a); see Steiner v. Commis-
sioner, 350 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1965); Mensik v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 147 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 827 (1964); Orkin, Duty of Going Forivard in Civil Tax
Fraud Cases, 42 A.B.A.J. 967 (1956).
39. See, e.g., Barnes v. Commissioner, 408 F.2d 65 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 836 (1969); Estate of Grace M. Scharf, 38 T.C. 15 (1962), affd, 316 F.2d 625
(7th Cir. 1963); Meldrum & Fewsmith, Inc., 20 T.C. 790 (1953), aff'd on other
grounds, 230 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1956); Standard Oil Co., 43 B.T.A. 973 (1941),
alr'd, 129 F.2d 363 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 688 (1942).
40. See, e.g., Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1934); Welch v. Helvering, 290
U.S. 111 (1933); Lydon v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1965); Zeddies v.
Commissioner, 264 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1959); Hord v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 73
(6th Cir. 1944). See also Cohen v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 5, 11 (9th Cir. 1959)
(court held Commissioner's determination "erroneous in substantial respects"). Oncehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/8
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trial, concessions by the Commissioner as to deductibility do not de-
stroy the presumption of correctness given to his deficiency determina-
tions.42  Concessions are incorporated into this presumption and are
then treated as stipulations; the courts, however, do not hesitate either
to modify43 or reject completely44 any stipulation by either party when
evidence of "manifest injustice" is present." When the Commissioner
concedes that some portion of the expense is deductible and the courts
concur that a concession is justified as a matter of law, the issue nar-
rows to a determination of whether the taxpayer has effected his bur-
den of allocation between deductible and nondeductible categories.40
the Tax Court has sustained the Commissioner's determination, it is up to the taxpayer
to show that the court's finding was "clearly erroneous." See, e.g., Gromacki v. Com-
missioner, 361 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1966); Lockwood Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 264
F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1959).
41. See, e.g., Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1934); Lucas v. Kansas City
Structural Steel Co., 281 U.S. 264 (1930); James E. Caldwell & Co. v. Commissioner,
234 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1956); Munn v. United States, 455 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
Some courts have held it is sufficient to show that the Commissioner's determination
was invalid. See, e.g., Weir v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1960); Polizzi v.
Commissioner, 265 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1959); Federal Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner,
180 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1950).
42. See, e.g., United States Holding Co., 44 T.C. 323, 328 (1965); Charles Oran
Mensik, 37 T.C. 703, 725 (1962), a!f'd, 328 F.2d 147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
827 (1964); Fada Gobins, 18 T.C. 1159, 1168-69 (1952), aff'd per curiam, 217 F.2d
952 (9th Cir. 1954).
43. See, e.g., South Bay Corp. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1965);
Clark v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1959); Davis v. Commissioner, 241
F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1957). See also TAx Cr. R. 31(b)(6):
No evidence received to alter or contradict.-The Court may set aside a stip-
ulation in whole or in part where justice requires, but otherwise will not re-
ceive evidence tending to qualify, change, or contradict any fact properly in-
troduced into the record by stipulation.
But see Henry v. Commissioner, 362 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1966).
44. See, e.g., Logan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1966);
Brinson v. Tomlinson, 264 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1959); Lewis v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d
32 (3d Cir. 1931); Ohio Clover Leaf Dairy Co., 8 B.T.A. 1249 (1927), affd per cur-
tam, 34 F.2d 1022 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 588 (1929).
45. See, e.g., Associated Beverages Co. v. P. Ballantine & Sons, 287 F.2d 261,
263 (5th Cir. 1961); Brinson v. Tomlinson, 264 F.2d 30, 34 (5th Cir. 1959).
46. See Munn v. United States, 455 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (attorney's fees for
tax advice); George v. United States, 434 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (attorney's fees
for property settlement resulting from divorce action); Carpenter v. United States, 338
F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (legal fees for tax advice in arranging property settlement in
divorce action). Failure to submit sufficient evidence of deductibility will result in the
entire amount being disallowed. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 131 F. Supp.
501 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Arthur D. McDonald, 52 T.C. 82 (1969). See generally Balter,
Relief from Abuse of Administrative Discretion, 46 MARQ. L. REv. 176 (1962); Mar-
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In Merians the majority broadly construed the effect of the Commis-
sioner's concession47 as satisfying the taxpayers' burden of proof of de-
duotibility.48 Despite the Commissioner's contention that there was
no basis in the record for making an allocation, the majority resolved
the allocation issue. Recognizing that estate planning has tax implica-
tions," the court relied on the testimony of petitioners' attorney as
the basis for applying the Cohan rule to determine the amount deduct-
ible under section 212(3). 0
cosson, The Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 29 TAXES 221 (1951); Ness, The Role of
Statutory Presumptions in Determining Federal Tax Liability, 12 TAx L. REv. 321
(1957); Rice, Tax, Fact and Fiction: Presumptions in Tax Cases, 1 S.D.L. REV. 56
(1956); Taylor, Tax Controversies: Some Administrative and Litigative Aspects, U.
So. CAL. 1962 TAx INsT. 257.
47. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
48. It is important to note that in two of the four concurring opinions it was stated
that concurrence was based solely on the fact of the Commissioner's concession. 60
T.C. at 190 (Scott, J., concurring); id. at 192 (Sterrett, J., concurring). Judge Scott's
opinion goes so far as to say that "respondent's concession . . . lulled petitioners into
offering proof only as to the portion of attorney's fees allocable to 'tax advice' . .
Id. at 190.
49. The services rendered to the taxpayer were: (1) preparation of a worksheet
with respect to the petitioner's present taxable estate; (2) drafting of wills for both
petitioner and his wife, taking into consideration the current requirements for the mari-
tal deduction; (3) establishment of an irrevocable trust for the primary benefit of the
wife; (4) transfer of certain corporate stock to that trust; (5) dissolution of petitioner's
corporation; (6) creation of a partnership, with the trust as a limited partner, to hold
the real estate previously owned by the dissolved corporation; (7) creation of an irre-
vocable life insurance trust for the primary benefit of the wife and the transfer of life
insurance policies to that trust (concluded after holding a conference with a second
attorney); and (8) preparation of gift tax returns by the principal attorney regarding
transfers to the trusts. Id. at 187-88.
In its opinion the court made the following analysis of estate planning:
A complete analysis of an estate involves more than a consideration of tax
consequences; in fact, it is basically concerned with transferring the client's
property to the persons he wishes to receive it. The client's financial condi-
tion, the nature of his property, the extent to which he wants various persons
to share in his estate, the needs and capacity of each intended beneficiary, the
details of State law, and the need for flexibility are among the multitude of
factors which are considered in establishing a plan to dispose of a client's
wealth.
Id. at 189. See generally A. CASNER, 1 ESTATE PLANNING (3d ed. 1961); R. HoI2MAN,
ESTATE PLANNING (1967). For a discussion of the possible tax consequences of estate
planning services, see Kabaker, supra note 14; Note, Income Tax Deductions for Estate
Planning Fees, 23 VAND. L. RaV. 104, 124 (1969).
50. Petitioner's attorney testified that he spent a "great deal of time doing tax
work" and that the plan adopted was specifically chosen "for tax implications only."
60 T.C. at 189. This is in accord with the position taken in the cases cited in note 33
supra. The court, however, rejected petitioner's claim that the entire fee was for taxhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/8
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In the first of two dissenting opinions in Mertans, Judge Withey
challenged the presumptive correctness of the Commissioner's conces-
sion51 and maintained that the taxpayers had satisfied neither the bur-
den of deductibility nor allocation. Judge Withey interpreted the
Commissioner's statement52 as conceding -that the cost of preparing
and filing the gift ,tax returns was ,the only deductible portion of the
fee. Judge Quealy, on the other hand, felt that no concession had been
made by the Commissioner"s and adopted the Commissioner's posi-
tion that the record was devoid of any basis for allocating a deduc-
tion. 4 Citing the legislative history, 5 both dissenting opinions con-
cluded that fees for estate planning services were never intended to
be within the parameters of section 212(3) as expenses incurred in
the determination, collection, or refund of any tax.
Merians is a significant case in that it evoked a response from all
sixteen members of the Tax Court, yet produced only a plurality of
opinion rather than a clear-cut majority stand on the issues pre-
sented.5 6 Inasmuch as the tax laws are based on voluntary compliance
with the system, great weight is justifiably given to determinations by
the Commissioner. The potential harshness of such a presumption has
consistently been mitigated by holding the taxpayer only to a good
advice:
We do have the attorney's testimony, and it convinces us that a significant
portion of his services consisted of tax advice. Yet, because of the vagueness
of such testimony and the lack of specificity, the allocation must be weighted
heavily against the petitioners. We find that 20 percent of the fee was for
tax advice.
60 T.C. at 190.
51. "It has long been settled that a concession or stipulation of parties litigant
with respect to law will not bind the Court when it does not agree with their construc-
tion thereof." 60 T.C. at 192 (Withey, J., dissenting). See also note 44 supra and ac-
companying text.
52. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
53. 60 T.C. at 198 (Quealy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added): "The opinion of
the majority is based on the supposed concession by the respondent ... "
54. Judges Withey, Hoyt, and Irwin agreed with this opinion. Id. See also note
48 supra.
55. Judge Withey further stated that he agreed with the position taken by Judge Da-
vis in his dissent in Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 336 (Ct. Cl. 1964). See note
30 supra. See also notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
56. Predicting future determinations by the Tax Court on these issues is further
complicated by the contradictions arising from the two dissenting opinions. Judge
Withey would have allowed a deduction for the gift tax, 60 T.C. at 194, whereas Judge
Quealy held there was no evidence upon which to base any allocation, id. at 198. Judges
Hoyt and Irwin agreed with both these opinions, and Judge Withey further allied him-
self with Judge Quealy!Washington University Open Scholarship
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faith standard for meeting his two burdens of proof,57 and by the lib-
erality of the courts in applying the Cohan rule.58 Merians seems to
add another weapon to a taxpayer's arsenal when rebutting the pre-
sumptive correctness of the Commissioner's deficiency determination;
by holding the Commissioner to his own statements when challenging
a taxpayer's claim of deductibility and his allocations under that claim,
the court has construed the Commissioner's admission of the prob-
ability of deductibility as a concession as a matter of law.59
Judicial construction of the scope of section 212(3) is still uncer-
tain. The few cases available indicate that the trend is to allow de-
ductions for tax matters irrespective of their nature,60 but whether fees
for estate planning services, either in their entirety or only in part,
fall within the exemption allowed by section 212(3) cannot be ascer-
tained. The flurry of opinions Merians produced may be no more
than a signal from the Tax Court to the Commissioner to try again
for a determination that estate planning fees are not deductible. 1
Thus attorneys and accountants who wish to give their clients im-
mediate tax benefits for their rendering of estate planning services
should specifically allocate their bills into deductible and nondeduct-
ible categories. Such itemization should preclude the need for litiga-
tion and serve to pinpoint the problem areas when conflicts do arise.
57. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
59. This contradicts the limitations placed on the use of the Commissioner's conces-
sion in Judge Withey's dissenting opinion. See text accompanying notes 44 & 51 supra.
60. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
61. This raises the question whether the Commissioner's acquiescence was for the
concession the majority said he made or whether it was directed to the deductibility of
estate planning fees. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
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